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ESSAY
PROPERTY METAPHORS AND KELO V. NEW
LONDON: TWO VIEWS OF THE CASTLE
Eduardo M Pehalver*
Metaphor occupies something of a fraught position within legal
discourse. As Robert Tsai has put it, "[l]egal scholars have traditionally
understood metaphor as, at worst, a perversion of the law, and at best, as a
necessary but temporary place-holder for more fully developed lines of
argument."1 Jeremy Bentham, for example, condemned metaphor as the
very antithesis of legal reasoning.2 And Benjamin Cardozo expressed a
similar suspicion when he said that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it."'3 The strenuousness of these objections to the use of metaphor
is a testament to metaphor's power to guide, or distort, the way we think
about legal categories.
Bruce Ackerman has famously distinguished the property discourse of
"scientific policymakers" from that of "ordinary observers."'4 Although
hostility to the use of metaphor in legal theory is often tinged with elitism,
the use of metaphor within the discourse of property is not limited to
Ackerman's "ordinary observers." Rather, both "scientific policymakers"
and "ordinary observers" make ample use of metaphor in their discussions
and analyses of property. The problem-and this may go a long way
towards explaining some of the controversy and confusion surrounding the
now infamous case of Kelo v. New London 5-is that the two groups rely on
fundamentally different metaphors.
For the scientific policy maker, the dominant property metaphor is the
"bundle of sticks."6 From their first year in law school, lawyers are taught
that, contrary to what they may have thought, property does not refer to
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor, Yale Law School. This paper was originally presented at the twelfth annual
Gallivan Conference at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Special thanks to the
participants in that conference and to Jeremy Paul for organizing an interesting discussion of
eminent domain.
1. Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 Geo. L.J. 181,
186 (2004).
2. See id.
3. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
4. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977).
5. Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
6. See Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion 278 (1994).
2971
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
things in the world, or even to the relationship between an owner and his
stuff, but rather to discrete rights among people with respect to things.
Moreover, those rights, although they tend to come in prepackaged bundles,
can, on this view, be infinitely disaggregated and repackaged. I may own a
parcel of land in fee simple, but I can peel off a few years and sell them as a
leasehold, or slice off the right to build a second story on my house and sell
it to my neighbor as a negative easement. Viewing property in this flexible
way is extremely helpful for lawyers, who are often called upon when
owners want to fine-tune their property arrangements in some subtle and
fine-grained way.
But, as Thomas Grey observed in his famous article, "The Disintegration
of Property," taken too literally, the "bundle of sticks" metaphor can lead to
the destruction of property itself as an intelligible category. 7 By incorrectly
suggesting that all property rights are equivalent to one another, the bundle
of sticks metaphor ignores the fact that, as Carol Rose has noted, some
property rights are likely to be more significant or fundamental than others. 8
And it disregards the possibility that, as Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith
have argued, it might be very costly to move away from a finite number of
standard property forms towards the bundle of sticks' image of limitless
malleability. 9 For all its shortcomings, however, the bundle of sticks
metaphor continues to serve a useful function for lawyers trying to get their
minds around the complexities of property doctrine and, consequently, is
not likely to disappear any time soon.
The same is true for the metaphor that dominates the property discourse
of "ordinary observers," the notion that a person's home is her castle. The
conception of one's home as a castle conjures a whole host of ideas about
the nature of private ownership. At the outset, however, it is important to
distinguish between two different versions of the castle metaphor: the
castle as dominion and the castle as dignity.
The castle metaphor understood as dominion conceives of the
homeowner as exercising a virtually unlimited power over his property, a
"sole and despotic dominion," as William Blackstone put it.10  The
dominion version of the castle metaphor calls to mind the image of
impenetrable fortress walls. On this reading, the castle metaphor yields a
very robust, perhaps even absolute, conception of the owner's right to
exclude. 11 This right to exclude encompasses private parties-who are
excluded through, among other things, the laws of trespass-as well as the
7. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Property: Nomos XXII, at
69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
8. See Rose, supra note 6, at 280.
9. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 35-37 (2000).
10. William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries *2.
11. See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Regulatory Takings:
Castles, Investments, and Regulatory Takings, Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 7-8), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-845904 (discussing the despotic
dominion conception of the castle metaphor).
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state, whose entry into the home is resisted through any number of legal
doctrines, including the Fourth Amendment. The state can of course
attempt to "enter" one's property in a multitude of ways-for example, by
regulating what goes on inside one's castle. Unsurprisingly, the castle
metaphor rejects these as well, relying on other legal doctrines, such as
regulatory takings law, to accomplish the task.
In contrast to this notion of the castle as a "despotic dominion," as a
bulwark against third parties, and, perhaps most importantly, against the
state, there is an alternative interpretation, one that is often overlooked or
erroneously lumped in with the dominion conception. On this alternative
view, the castle metaphor is a statement not so much about the power of the
property owner to do as he pleases, but about the inherent dignity of
homeownership. Apart from, or perhaps in addition to, any connotation of
unqualified power, the statement that one's home is a castle can be
understood as a statement about the subjective importance and status that
our society attaches to homeownership. Consider the famous nineteenth
century ballad, "Home, Sweet Home," with its assertion that, "Be it ever so
humble there's no place like home!" 12 The dignitary reading of the castle
metaphor evokes precisely the same irony of the attachment homeowners
develop with their property: You may think this home of mine is a
worthless shack, but this is my home, and therefore to me it's a castle.
The contours of the castle metaphor help to explain a great deal of the
public reaction to the Kelo case, which concerned the contours of the state's
power of eminent domain. That power, enshrined in the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, permits the state to take one's property "for
public use" upon the payment of "just compensation."' 13 This power is
anathema to the despotic dominion version of the castle metaphor for two
reasons. First, the very fact of being forced to sell one's property-at any
price-violates the metaphor's vision of an owner's absolute and exclusive
12. John Howard Payne, Home Sweet Home, in Yale Book of American Verse 34
(Thomas R. Lounsbury ed., 1912). The ballad, written in 1823 as part of an operetta,
achieved remarkable popularity in a very short period of time after its publication. See Peter
Goodman, Hampton, Sweet Hampton, Newsday, Mar. 22, 1998, at H30. Needless to say, it
has, in the intervening century, become an American cultural icon as an unapologetic ode to
the humble dignity of homeownership:
Mid pleasures and palaces though we may roam,
Be it ever so humble there's no place like home!
A charm from the sky seems to hallow us there,
Which, seek through the world, is ne'er met with elsewhere.
Home! home! sweet, sweet home!
There's no place like home!
An exile from home, splendor dazzles in vain:
0, give me my lowly thatched cottage again!
The birds singing gayly that came at my call;-
Give me them,-and the peace of mind dearer than all!
Home! home! sweet, sweet home!
There's no place like home!
Payne, supra, at 34.
13. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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control over his property. Second, as if to add insult to injury, the
constitutional measure of "just compensation" for eminent domain-fair
market value-implicitly rejects the high subjective attachment
presupposed by the castle metaphor's identification of the modest home
with the stately castle.
The important thing to note about this tension between the castle
metaphor and the power of eminent domain, though, is that it has little to do
with the use to which the property is put. The castle metaphor, understood
as "despotic dominion," makes no allowance for involuntary dispossession,
whether the use to which the community wishes to put the home is noble
and public, or venal and private.
Like the bundle of sticks, the castle metaphor, particularly the despotic
dominion version, has its own shortcomings. As Joseph Singer, Eric
Freyfogle, and others have argued, the most extreme and literal version of
despotic dominion is an impossibility. 14 To begin with, owners can never
have absolute property rights, understood either as the absolute right to do
as they please with their property (to be absolute masters within their
castle), or as the absolute right to be left alone (to be protected by
impenetrable castle walls). This is because, as a physical matter, most
property does not much resemble castles. What one owner does, whether it
be refusing to mow his lawn or playing loud music, will inevitably have
some impact on neighboring owners. When owners prove unwilling or
unable to sort out disagreements about such spillover effects on their own,
the state will have to make decisions about which spillover effects owners
must tolerate and which spillover-creating actions they may not take, even
within the walls of their castles. In addition, the fact is that we are social
beings and that we affirmatively care what our neighbors think of us. We
simply cannot live healthy human lives by retreating behind the walls of our
castles to live in isolation from others. Accordingly, even within the safety
of our castle walls, we are susceptible to pervasive and, at times, coercive
social pressures that will constrain the ways in which we can make use even
of those property rights recognized by the state. 1 5
Despite these conceptual problems, there is no denying that the castle
metaphor remains alive and well in popular conceptions of property. The
public reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's Kelo decision permitting the
exercise of eminent domain for economic development was swift and
virtually unanimous. Polling data collected in the weeks following the
decision measured public opposition to the decision at approximately ninety
percent. 16 People are serious about protecting their homes against eminent
domain, and the broadly shared view of the private home as a castle plays
no small role in that phenomenon.
14. See, e.g., Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share 1-9 (2003); Joseph William Singer,
Entitlement 7-9 (2000).
15. See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1889 (2005).
16. See Castle Coalition, The Polls Are In,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/resources/kelojpolls.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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Given the problems with the castle metaphor, however, why would this
be the case? It seems likely that the castle conception remains a touchstone
for popular discussions of property precisely because it taps into important
truths about the way in which people relate to their homes. As a
consequence, the metaphor serves a crucial rhetorical purpose that itself
functions as something of a political shield protecting this unique category
of property. But this rhetorical power of the castle metaphor is likely
rooted as much in the dignitary understanding of the castle metaphor as the
despotic dominion conception. And that dignitary understanding is not
vulnerable to the same objections correctly leveled against despotic
dominion.
Primarily for the dignitary reasons identified above, people do really
think of their homes, however humble, as their castles. Owners dote
attention on their homes, investing substantial resources in even the most
modest of dwellings. To fail to treat someone's home with the respect that
it deserves is to seriously insult their sense of dignity and self-worth. Far
more than they expect to be free from any state interference in their use and
enjoyment of their homes, people expect their homes and their
homeownership to be treated with the respect and dignity appropriate to the
significance it has in their lives.
Rooting opposition to eminent domain in the second, dignitary
understanding of the castle metaphor yields a substantially more flexible
stance towards the power of eminent domain, one that is not opposed to
eminent domain across the board. Instead, it simply demands that, when
the state exercises the power of eminent domain against private
homeowners, it does so in a manner that gives due regard to the importance
of the property in question to the lives of the people being displaced. The
state can satisfy this requirement both by refraining from the exercise of
eminent domain against homeowners except when necessary to accomplish
important public objectives, and by recognizing the value of the property
owner's interests by adequately compensating owners for their losses.
When the state deprives owners of their homes for reasons that appear to be
insufficiently weighty or ill-considered, or when it offers them patently
insufficient compensation, eminent domain becomes an affront to the
dignity reflected in my second interpretation of the castle metaphor. But
eminent domain that is appropriately sensitive to the significance of
homeownership in the lives of owners is far less objectionable.
From the point of view of this second interpretation, the exploitation of
the castle metaphor by property rights activists in the wake of Kelo is
understandable but at the same time problematic. In the days after the Kelo
decision, for example, the Institute for Justice's "Castle Coalition" web site
became a clearinghouse for information about efforts to limit eminent
domain through legislative action. 17  The manipulation of the castle
metaphor by the Institute for Justice and others is understandable because,
17. Castle Coalition, http://www.castlecoalition.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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however hyperbolic their advocacy, it is consistent with an important
insight concealed within the metaphor: that government action depriving
people of their homes is serious business. The advocates and practitioners
of eminent domain must carefully consider the power they wield, using it
only when necessary to accomplish important public goals. In addition,
they must effectively communicate to the public that they understand and
respect the importance of the private home and that they will not lightly
dispossess owners, however politically vulnerable.
But at the same time, the use of this rhetoric by property-rights advocates
is problematic for the reasons Cardozo gave for his suspicion of
metaphor. 18 All too often, metaphor develops a force of its own, making it
easy to slip from an initial application that is perfectly reasonable to one
that does not make much sense. And, indeed, there is something of a
disconnect between the substance of the castle metaphor-properly limited
to the special dignity of the private homeowner-and the contours of the
policy prescriptions property rights advocates are promoting in response to
Kelo.
For example, the Institute for Justice has posted model eminent domain
reform legislation on its web site. 19 That model legislation limits eminent
domain quite dramatically, but the limitation would not apply solely to
protect people's homes, their castles.20 Instead, it would apply to any
private property, anywhere. This is no small point, because less than ten
percent of privately owned land in the United States is used for homes. The
vast majority of privately owned land in this country is held, not by private
homeowners, but by large agricultural and mining interests, many of whom
are active donors to property rights advocacy groups. Providing heightened
protection against eminent domain for all private land is an unnecessarily
over-inclusive way of protecting people's castles; it permits a politically
powerful, well-funded, and well-connected set of property owners to
piggyback on the rhetorical power of a conception of property that has
nothing to do with their own relationship to the land. Your home may be
your castle, but Alcoa's aluminum mines do not possess, and should not be
understood to share, the same lofty status.
In short, there is no denying that metaphors provide powerful and
illuminating insights into the ways in which people relate to property, both
as lawyers and laymen. The notion that a person's home is her castle is
likely to remain a powerful, pervasive, and enduring conception of
ownership that policy makers fail to take seriously at their peril. But as
lawmakers try to understand and respond to the public reaction to the Kelo
decision, it is important to keep in mind not only the power of the castle
metaphor, but also its limits.
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. Castle Coalition, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2006).
20. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home, 81 Notre Dame L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
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